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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, electronic transactions are routine. Communication by e-mail, somewhat
novel ten years ago, is now part of our daily lives. The same can be said for the purchase
of goods on the Internet. As persons contract in new ways, courts are called upon to rule
on the legal effects of these new modes of communication.1 The cases that we discuss in
this article show the continuing development of contract law in the electronic
environment.

The cases surveyed in this article show a maturation of the law of electronic
contracts. Two of the cases remind us that while an electronic record signed
electronically can constitute an enforceable contract, the electronic record does not
always create a binding obligation.2 Another pair of cases addresses the enforceability of
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web site terms and conditions when those terms and conditions are purportedly
incorporated by reference into a binding agreement. One court ruled that such
incorporation was effective3 and the other held that the web site terms had not been
effectively incorporated into the agreement in question.4

Cases involving electronically delivered contract terms have been challenging
courts since the late 1990s. In the early years of these disputes, the judges focused on
whether those terms, generally labeled “click-wrap” and “browse-wrap,” were
enforceable. Today, it is well-settled that electronic terms can be enforced, so long as
certain conditions are met. One of the opinions that we discuss below5 is notable for its
recognition that online terms cannot necessarily be neatly characterized as “click-wrap”
or “browse-wrap.” While the case involved the certification of a class action and did not
decide whether the electronically delivered terms at issue were enforceable, it contains a
thoughtful discussion of electronic contracting.

As we did in our last survey,6 we discuss here several cases dealing with the
enforceability of forum selection (including arbitration) clauses in electronic agreements.
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These cases are notable for a variety of reasons. In one,7 the court, following the leading
case of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 8 applied the Uniform Commercial Code to a software
contract and, like the Seventh Circuit in ProCD, rejected the “battle of the forms”
argument. In two of them,9 the courts focused on whether the web sites at issue
adequately communicated the contract terms in question. In the fourth case, the court
refused to enforce the choice of forum clause against a consumer because the clause
imposed an “unreasonable geographical barrier[].”10

Another case11 centered on the question of whether a contract provision that
requires notices to be given “in writing” allows such notices to be provided
electronically. The case raises an intriguing question which, unfortunately, the court did
not analyze.

The last case merits mention in part because it applied the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”) to a software licensing problem, albeit without discussion and with the
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consent of the parties.12 In applying the UCC, the court was required to decide whether
terms appearing on a web page were conspicuous.

II. INTENT TO FORM A CONTRACT ONLINE

Statutory law now makes clear that a contract cannot be denied enforcement
solely because it is in electronic from or signed electronically.13 The statutes do not
resolve all disputes that may arise from the form of an electronic contract. Two of the
cases that we reviewed this year, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Recovery Express,
Inc.,14and Brantley v. Wilson,15 illustrate some of the problems that lawyers need to
consider when entering into electronic transactions.

The electronic transactions statutes define an electronic signature as “an electronic
sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”16 The Official Comments to
UETA make clear that a person’s name in an e-mail communication can suffice as a

12

Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N. D. Tex. 2006 ). In last
year’s survey, we discussed other cases that applied the U.C.C. to software contracts. See generally
Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 441-42.
13
The two most important statutes are the Uniform Electronics Transaction Act, (“UETA”), 7A
U.L.A.§701; and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (“E-Sign”), 15 U.S.C.
§§7001-7031 (2000).
14

415 F. Supp. 2d 6 (2006).

15

Civil No. 05-5093, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2006).

16

UETA § 2(8); 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5).

4

signature if the person whose name appears in the e-mail has the intent to sign the
record.17

The effect of a person’s name in an e-mail communication was at issue in both
CSX Transportation and Brantley v. Wilson. In CSX Transportation, a seller argued that a
corporation’s domain name in an e-mail address constituted an electronic signature; in
Brantley, a buyer of real estate argued that the seller’s name in an e-mail constituted the
required signature. Both cases illustrate the pitfalls that may await those who enter into
transactions electronically, and both cases remind lawyers that the same level of care that
is necessary in the paper world is also necessary in the electronic world.

In Brantley v. Wilson, prospective buyers of a parcel of real estate exchanged a
series of e-mail messages with its owner. When the sellers decided not to sell the parcel
to the buyers, the buyers sued for specific performance, and the sellers moved for
summary judgment. In support of their motion, the defendants argued that they did not
intend to form a contract through their e-mail messages,18 and that any agreement
resulting from their electronic exchange would not satisfy the statute of frauds.19 The
court denied the summary judgment motion, finding that there were genuine issues of
material fact regarding (1) whether the sellers intended to consummate their transaction
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electronically, and (2) whether the seller intended her typed name on her e-mails to
constitute her signature.20

The e-mail messages exchanged by the parties contained the price of the property,
the financing terms, a proposed allocation of the closing costs, and a description of the
land. The sellers argued that the e-mails were merely negotiations in anticipation of a
contract that eventually would be embodied in a paper agreement, a contention that was
supported by the fact that several of the e-mail messages referred to a forthcoming paper
contract.21

The court noted that the parties’ communications could have formed an
enforceable electronic contract under the Arkansas version of UETA, but that UETA
applies only when parties have agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means.22
Under UETA, whether the parties have agreed to transact electronically is determined
from the context and the surrounding circumstances.23 Because the existence of such an
agreement was in dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Brantley v. Wilson contains an important lesson for lawyers: if you don’t want
your e-mails to form a contract, make that clear in the electronic messages. The seller in
Brantley could have avoided litigation had she not assumed that her communications with
the prospective buyer would not bind her absent a paper contract. Because the electronic

20
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transactions statutes allow electronic communications to result in binding obligations that
satisfy the statute of frauds, it is particularly important for communicating parties to make
their intentions known at the outset of their correspondence. Although this lesson is
hardly a new one, or unique to electronic communications, it is one about which constant
reminder seems necessary.

CSX Transportation v. Recovery Express24 reminds us that while an e-mail
address can constitute a binding signature, it might be foolish for contracting parties to
rely solely on an e-mail address as a signature. In that case, a buyer named Albert
Arillotta sent CSX an e-mail message expressing an interest in buying out-of-service
railroad cars. Arillotta represented himself to be from “interstate demolition and recovery
express” [sic], and his e-mail address was albert@recoveryexpress.com. Arillotta’s check
bounced, however, and CSX attempted to recover the purchase price from Recovery
Express. After CSX filed its breach of contract claim against Recovery Express, the latter
moved for summary judgment.25

Arillotta had never worked for Recovery Express, but he was affiliated with
Interstate Demolition. The two companies shared office space and the employees of the
two companies shared e-mail services. Len Whitehead, who entered into the contract on
behalf of CSX, claimed that he believed that Arillotta was authorized to transact business
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for Recovery Express.26 This belief was based in large part on Arillotta’s e-mail address,
which, of course, contained the phrase “recovery express.”

In granting the motion for summary judgment motion filed by Recovery Express,
the court chided CSX for allowing itself to be duped by Arillotta. CSX had argued that,
by giving Arillotta an e-mail address in the recoveryexpress.com domain, Recovery
Express had granted Arillotta apparent authority to transact business on its behalf. The
court noted the flaws in this reasoning, observing that CSX’s argument would mean that,
“every subordinate employee with a company e-mail address – down to the night
watchman – could bind a company to the same contracts as the president.”27

The court also noted that the question presented in the case was really not a
question of first impression. In doing so, it cited by analogy cases from the world of
paper contracting where apparent authority was not automatically conferred by the use of
business cards, company cars, and letterheads.28 Because the wise business executive
looks behind the claim of authority, the CSX court was able to hold, as a matter of law,
that failure to do so cancelled the claim of reliance.

As the court in CSX stressed, there were a number of ways that CSX could have
protected itself. Given the anonymity of the Internet, a company in a significant
26
27
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transaction should not rely solely on an e-mail address as the signature of a contracting
party; instead, it should request a more reliable form of authentication. 29 CSX learned
that lesson the hard way.

III. WHEN DOES A CONTRACT INCLUDE TERMS POSTED ON A WEB SITE?

It is a well-established rule of contract law that a written agreement may
incorporate other written agreements by reference.30 Many cases discuss this rule as it
applies to contracts that are written on paper and signed in ink, 31 but few apply it to
electronic contracts. Two cases decided in the last year, Hugger-Mugger, LLC v.
NetSuite, Inc.32 and Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consolidated Credit Counseling Services,33
discuss the requirements that must be satisfied in order for a written contract to include
terms posted on a web site.

In both cases, the parties entered into written agreements that referred to terms
posted online. The written contract in Hugger-Mugger contained the following language:
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In consideration of the license fee paid by Customer
[Hugger-Mugger] and subject to the terms of this
agreement and the Terms of Service posted at
www.NetSuite.com, or successor Web site, NetSuite grants
Customer, its employees, and agents a nonexclusive,
nontransferable license to use the Service for internal
business purposes . . . This Agreement and Incorporated
Terms of Service represent the entire agreement of the
parties.34

The written agreement in Affinity Internet contained similar language, stating that the
contract was “subject to all of SkyNetWEB’s terms, conditions and acceptable user
policies located” at a web site named in the contract.35 In both of the cases, the online
terms contained an arbitration provision that the defendant in each case wanted to
enforce.

Both Hugger-Mugger and Affinity Internet involved business-to-business
contracts, but the two courts came to different conclusions about the terms of those
contracts. While both courts relied on the same basic principles in their decisions, the
court in Hugger-Mugger ruled that the web site terms became part of the contract and the
court in Affinity held that they did not.

34
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The two courts set forth somewhat different tests for determining whether or not
the writings sufficiently incorporated the web site terms by reference. The court in
Hugger-Mugger used a three-part test for incorporation by reference: the reference to the
outside document must be “clear and unequivocal,” the offering party must bring that
reference to the terms to attention of the other party who then must consent, and the terms
of the document sought to be incorporated must be “known or easily available to the
contracting parties.”36 Applying this test, the court found that the language of the
agreement in question clearly identified, referred to, and incorporated the web site terms.
The court explained that the consent element was met because Hugger-Mugger signed the
writing and therefore was bound by the provisions of the writing regardless of whether
anyone at Hugger-Mugger had read the terms.37 Here, the court conceded that its holding
might have been different had the contract been one of adhesion, but finding no
inequality in bargaining power, the court was satisfied that Hugger-Mugger had agreed to
the incorporated terms.

The application of the first two parts of the test set forth in Hugger-Mugger is not
unique to Internet transactions. Parties who attempt to incorporate terms on a web page
should pay special attention to the third part of the test, however. Under that part, the
terms claimed to be incorporated must be known or easily available to the offeree at the
time that it signs the written contract. In Hugger-Mugger, NetSuite was able to show that

36

Hugger-Mugger, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14.

37

Id. at *15-16.

11

its Terms of Service were available on the Internet in the form relevant to the written
document at the time that the parties signed the written document.38

The court in Affinity also relied on the law of paper contracts. The court ruled
that, “[a] mere reference to another document is not sufficient to incorporate that other
document into a contract, particularly where the incorporating document makes no
specific reference that it is ‘subject to’ the collateral document.”39 In other words, the
contract had to do more than simply state that it is subject to another document. 40 Rather,
the seller either had to provide the document to the buyer41 or had to “sufficiently
describe the document or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the
writing.”42

How the court reached that conclusion is not known; there simply is no reasoning
in the opinion. The question, of course, is whether the collateral agreement is “available”
(to use the court’s term) when it can be found on line and the link is plainly mentioned in
the paper contract. Was there some reason why a business buyer of computer equipment
38

Hugger-Mugger also raised the issue of apparent authority. The employee who “clicked” was not shown
to have had actual authority to bind Hugger-Mugger. Nevertheless, the company was bound to the deal
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noted that the employee had conducted most of the negotiations for the software purchase, had been given
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That conclusion seems correct.
39

40

Affinity Internet, 920 So. 2d at at 1288
Id.

41

The court seemed to suggest that the collateral document might be binding if given to the buyer
“subsequent to the signing.” Id. The court did not explain how terms delivered after formation could affect
what was in the deal.
42

Id.
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could not refer to the web site to learn the terms posted there? None was shown. Was
doing so any more difficult than reading sheets of paper attached to the written
agreement? We are not told of any. In other words, is there something about electronic
documents that makes them different from paper documents? If not, there is no good
reason not to hold that the website document was not “available” to the buyer, and thus
binding on it.

IV. THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF THE CLICK-WRAP – BROWSE-WRAP DISTINCTION

The electronic age has spawned several new methods of delivering contract terms.
Before courts were asked to opine on the enforceability of terms delivered over the
Internet, they were faced with software licenses delivered in shrink-wrapped boxes of
computer software. Courts and commentators dubbed these agreements “shrink-wrap”
agreements. When terms delivered over the Internet started to appear in court, the courts
pointed to these shrink-wrap terms as analogies and christened Internet terms “clickwrap” if the offeree was required to click an “I agree” icon to accept the offered terms or
“browse-wrap” if the terms provided the offeree was bound simply by using, or
“browsing” the web site.43

43
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While the distinction between click-wrap and browse-wrap terms has been
important in the electronic contracting world, the court in Hotels.com v. Canales44
correctly discounts the labels given to online terms. Hotels.com involved the certification
of a class-action; one issue in the case was whether Ms. Canales’ claims were based on
the same legal theories as those of the other class members. Typicality was an issue
because Ms. Canales made her Hotels.com reservation over the telephone while the
majority of the other class members made theirs through the Hotels.com web site.

The question of whether Ms. Canales satisfied the typicality requirement turned
on the enforceability of the Hotels.com User Agreement. The User Agreement contained
an arbitration provision, which was not binding on Ms. Canales because she had made
her reservations over the telephone. Therefore, in order to certify the class, the court had
to determine whether the arbitration provision in the User Agreement was binding on
those who made reservations through the Hotels.com web site.45

The Hotels.com reservation page required its users to click on a button that said “I
Agree to the Terms and Conditions Book Reservation” [sic] in order to complete their
reservations.46 Above the “I agree” button, the web page had the following statement:
“By proceeding with this reservation, you agree to all Terms and Conditions, [including]

44
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all terms contained in the User Agreement.”47 The words “User Agreement” were
underlined and hyperlinked to the agreement itself.

Because the terms of the User Agreement were not presented on the reservation
page with the “I agree” button, the court noted that the agreement could not be “neatly
characterized as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’ agreement.” As a result, the court
focused not on the click-wrap/browse-wrap distinction but rather on whether the users of
the web site had adequate notice of the terms in question.48 In its analysis of the notice
issue, the court discussed three well-known Internet contracting cases, Specht v.
Netscape,49 Register.com v. Verio,50 and Barnett v. Network Solutions,51 and in its short
explanation of each decision, the Hotels.com court focused on the discussion in those
precedents of whether the offerees had notice of and an opportunity to read the offered
terms.

The court in Hotels.com remanded the case so that the trial court could analyze
whether the consumers who made their hotel reservations over the Internet were provided
with adequate notice of the arbitration provision. In doing so, it correctly rejected the
approach of a number of early Internet contracting cases that held that a click signified
47

Id. The Hotels.com web page today presents its terms differently. See www.hotels.com (last visited June
6, 2006).
48

One of us has advocated this approach to electronic contracts. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent
and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1330-1331 (2005) (criticizing decisions that hold that
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49
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agreement regardless of the physical presentation of the click or the terms purportedly
agreed to.52 This approach is correct because it incorporates the longstanding rule
regarding the enforceability of paper standard form terms. When paper standard form
terms do not require a signature, such terms are enforceable if they meet a “reasonable
communicativeness” test.53

V. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

Forum selection clauses54 are a recurring problem in contract law generally, and
in electronic contracting specifically. It is not hard to understand why; the situs of
litigation can confer significant advantages to a party in terms of ease of access, expense,
familiarity with the courts, and substantive law. The choice of situs, therefore, can
determine whether litigation takes place at all. The battle over forum-selection clauses
can prove to be the most important aspect of the case; no wonder it is often a hard-fought
affair. There are four such cases in this year’s review.

The first of those cases, SalcoDistributors, LLC v. iCode, Inc.,55 is worth noting
only because it confirms what has become well-established law. Salco is a click-wrap

52

Such cases include Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A. 2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), I.
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53
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case.56 Plaintiff ordered software from defendant by sending signed purchase orders to
the defendant. The purchase orders stated that they were “subject to the conditions of the
Software’s End User License and Service Agreements.”57

When the software arrived in the form of a CD, Plaintiff inserted the CD into its
computer. When the plaintiff did so, the terms of the End User License Agreement were
displayed on the computer screen. The instructions on the CD required plaintiff to click
its assent to the terms of the agreement before installing the software. It did so. The
agreement it had assented to with that click contained a forum selection clause.58

When the inevitable litigation arose, plaintiff claimed that the forum selection
clause was a material alteration under UCC §2-207, and, therefore, not part of the
contract that had been formed by the purchase orders.

The court, following Judge

Easterbrook’s landmark (and widely accepted) opinion in ProCD,59 rejected that
argument and analyzed the case under § 2-204 of the U.C.C., which provides that a
56

The case also involved a shrink-wrap problem, but that issue was not discussed by the court.

57

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9483, *2. The plaintiffs also argued that the click-wrap terms were not adequately
incorporated by reference into the purchase orders, but the court was not persuaded by the argument. Id. at
*12-13.
58

SalcoDistributors, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9843 at *4-5.

59
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v. Hardin Constr. Co., L.L.C., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Ca. 2006) (finding the ProCD reasoning
“compelling”); Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691,692 (N.D.W.V. 2005)
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Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 688-689 (1998) (noting
that “the result in the ProCD case is controversial).
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“contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract.”60 It
found, not surprisingly, that when plaintiff clicked its assent after having the opportunity
to review the agreement, the forum selection clause became part of the agreement.

The plaintiff in Salco had clearly been given the opportunity to read the terms of
the license agreement, a fact that was important to the court’s decision. Not only did the
terms of the agreement appear on the plaintiff’s computer screen when he inserted the CD
into the computer, but the agreement was also printed on the software envelope. These
facts caused the court to characterize as unpersuasive the plaintiff’s argument that it did
not expressly accept the terms of the agreement.

The second case, Hubbert v. Dell Corp.,61 was similarly routine, although the
court’s analysis had some interesting language. The term in dispute (an arbitration
clause) could be found in seller’s Terms and Conditions of Sale. The Terms could be
found by using hyperlinks found on each of five web pages containing forms that the
buyer had to fill out to complete the contract—and the last three forms made clear that
the contract was conditioned on agreement with the Terms.62

The plaintiffs argued that they had not agreed to the arbitration provision because
they were not required to click an “I accept” box. The court rejected this argument (and

60
61

62

U.C.C. § 2-204.
835 N.E. 2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
Id. at 117-118.
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thus any legal distinction between click-wrap and browse-wrap terms) and focused
instead on whether the plaintiffs had received adequate notice of the disputed terms. It
recognized that people who routinely use computers know what how hyperlinks are
presented and what they mean, and therefore that, a prominently displayed hyperlink can
adequately communicate the terms to be found behind the link. The key language
embodied judicial common-sense at its best:

The blue hyperlinks on the Defendant’s web pages, constituting the fivestep process for ordering the computers, should be treated the same as a
multi-page, written, paper contract. The blue hyperlink simply takes a
person to another page of the contract, similar to turning the page of a
written paper contract. Although there is no conspicuousness requirement,
the hyperlink’s contrasting blue type makes it conspicuous. Common
sense dictates that because the plaintiffs were purchasing computers
online, they were not novices when using computers. A person using a
computer quickly learns that more information is available by clicking on
a blue hyperlink.63

The next case, Aral v. Earthlink, Inc.,64 was not as interesting from an electronic
point of view but nevertheless reminds us that sometimes contracts between a business
and a consumer are treated differently from those between two businesses. The
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Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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134 Cal. App. 4th 544 (2005).
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agreement at issue in Aral was a click-wrap software license that contained a class action
waiver and an arbitration clause. The court refused to enforce the two clauses, holding
that class action waivers “are unconscionable where the class involves allegations that a
large number of consumers have been cheated out a small sum of money,” and that a
forum selection clause that imposes “unreasonable geographical barriers” is
unenforceable.65 Although that holding is important, it merely tracks the decisional law of
the California Supreme Court. The lesson in the case for parties questioning the
enforceability of Internet contracts is that when a consumer is involved, notice of terms
might not be sufficient. The terms themselves must also be reasonable.

More interesting was the novel question raised, but not addressed by the case: Do
the terms of a click-wrap agreement bind the employer of a software engineer who
installed software he bought from the defendant by using alternative means of installation
that enabled him to avoid clicking his assent to the terms of sale that accompanied the
software?

Resolution of that issue seems fairly easy when the world of paper commerce is
considered. One who consciously avoids reading part of an agreement cannot escape
being bound by the terms she skipped.66 If that were not so, the law of contracts would be
seriously undermined. The engineer in Aral should be treated similarly. As an expert in
the field he surely knew (or should have known) that his installation method permitted

65

Id. at 548-549.
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PERILLO, supra note 31 at § 9.41.
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him to ignore the need to click his assent to the terms of sale proposed by the vendor.67
He also knew that his assent to those terms was a condition of the sale of the software.
He was aware, in other words, that he was trying to impose a deal on Earthlink different
from its proposal, and one about which Earthlink knew nothing. The law should not
condone that kind of practice in the electronic world any more than it does in the paper
world.
VI. “WRITTEN” NOTIFICATION
A life insurance policy provides that the insured can change a designated
beneficiary only by giving “written notice.” The insured sent a notice of change of
beneficiaries by electronic communication. Is that notice effective under the insurance
contract? That was the situation presented in Seagate US LLC v. Cigna Corp.68

The case arose on defendant insurance company’s motion to dismiss. Both sides
invoked the authority of E-Sign.69 The insurance company contended that the law does
not “require any person to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures . . . .”70
The insured relied on another provision of E-Sign which states that “a signature, contract,
or other record . . . may not be denied legal effect . . . because it is in electronic form . . .

67

As the court in Hubbert noted: “Common sense dictates that because the plaintiffs were purchasing
computers online, they were not novices when using computers.” 835 N.E. 2d at 121.
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No. C 05-4272 PVT, 2006 WL 1071881 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2006).
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Arguments concerning the language of the contract and ordinary usage were also made; we will not
discuss them here, however.
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15 U.S.C. § 7001 (b)(2).
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.”71 At first glance, those provisions seem contradictory; when the purpose behind the
adoption of E-Sign is considered, however, the two clauses may be reconciled.

E-Sign (and its companion, UETA) were adopted to ensure that electronic
communications were not denied legal effect simply because of their electronic form.72
In other words, paper and electronic communications were made equally effective by
those statutes, in the eyes of the law. To be sure, the parties could always require either
form of communication - - hence, the insurance company’s argument that it is not
required to accept electronic communications - - but that is a decision for the parties to
make and not one required by the law. Thus, if there is some reason -- and we can’t think
of one -- why email notification of a change in beneficiary should not be effective, then
the burden should be on the insurance company to make that clear in the contract.
Otherwise, the statutory goal of placing electronic and paper communications on a par
with each other would not be met.

Because the opinion is on a motion to dismiss, the court in Seagate did not decide
whether the term “written notice” includes electronic notice. The court refused to dismiss
the case so that the meaning of the phrase “written notice” could be determined. While
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this might seem to be a novel issue in the E-Sign age, courts have been refining the
meaning of “written notice” for years.73

VII. CONSPICUOUS WEB SITE TERMS

One of the claims in Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc.,74
was for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose. An employee of Interactive Intelligence had downloaded a Recursion software
program from a web site. In order to receive the software, the employee was required to
accept the terms of the online License Agreement. The license page displayed the terms
of the License Agreement in a window in which only part of the agreement was visible.
The page allowed users to scroll through the terms of the agreement.75

The court applied the Uniform Commercial Code to the license. Under the UCC,
a seller can disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose if it does so in a conspicuous manner.76 According to the UCC, a conspicuous
term is one that is displayed in such a way that a reasonable person “ought to have
noticed it.”77
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See Clyburn v. Allstate Ins. Co., 826 F. Supp. 955 (D. S.C. 1993) (holding that information on a
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The court found that the disclaimer at issue was conspicuous because it was
written in capital letters and because the License Agreement was relatively short.78 While
this might not seem to be an earth-shattering pronouncement, it is significant because it
applies the paper-world standard for conspicuousness to electronic contracts.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Most of the cases we have discussed were decided sensibly. That is due, in part, to
the fact they were mostly business-to-business cases that did not involve consumers. The
courts seem willing to treat businesses as fully capable of protecting themselves, absent
some form of trickery. In addition, however, the courts showed remarkable willingness
to treat Internet and paper transactions as equals—similar results should be reached
unless there is a reason to treat them differently.79 That was the goal of E-Sign and
UETA, and it reflects one of the basic goals of the common law—like cases should be
treated in like fashion. Judges no longer are scared of electronic cases. The decisions are
getting better.
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425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 786.
The unwillingness of the Affinity Internet court to keep that argument in mind probably explains the bad
result in that case. See notes 39 - 42 supra and accompanying text.
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